After decades of debating the “scientific publishing crisis”, the time has come to decide.
In: science politicsThis is an English translation of my original German contribution to the Merkur Blog in response to the contributions by Gehring and Tautz.
“Scientific publishing” may sound like a minor rung in the ivory tower. It is not. The system reaches far beyond academia. Around it, a largely AI-driven fraud industry has taken shape, generating revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually. In one of its first executive orders, the second Trump administration invoked the replication crisis in scientific publishing to justify political intervention in selected research fields. Meanwhile, a small group of multinational corporations extracts extraordinary profits from the legal component of this publicly funded system. These profits are not abstract. Billions have flowed into data-driven surveillance technologies—some of which are now monetized through the resale of data to government agencies such as ICE in the United States. With profit margins exceeding 40 percent, not only such strategic acquisitions but also executive compensation kept growing over the decades. Without library funds for Pergamon press, the daughter of publishing giant Robert Maxwell, Ghislaine Maxwell, probably would have never come even close to Jeffrey Epstein. Over the three decades in which academia has debated its “serials crisis,” public funds have not only helped fund the Epstein class and AI fraud; they also sustained an increasingly dysfunctional system; they have helped consolidate corporate power whose externalities now spill into politics, surveillance, and democratic governance. As Petra Gehring recently asked in Merkur (in German): “who within the scientific system understood this—and when?”
There has never been a shortage of attempts to fix the crisis. Yet both Gehring’s essay and Diethard Tautz’s reply (in German) make clear why many earlier attempts faltered. More recent initiatives aim at something more fundamental. Gehring discusses not only the Leopoldina’s proposal but also our own: to replace the historically grown journal system with decentralized infrastructures for scientific communication.
The list of crises is long: replication crisis, affordability crisis, functionality crisis, the rising tsunami of AI-Slop. Increasingly, what once appeared as isolated pathologies reveals itself as a systemic breakdown. Well-intentioned attempts at reform have often intensified and worsened the very dynamics they sought to correct. The infrastructural layer—long treated as a technical afterthought—now threatens the system’s intellectual and institutional integrity. Our proposal begins from this recognition: the historically grown, corporate-captured publishing system must be replaced by a modern, publicly governed communication infrastructure – a scholarly commons.
On core financial and technical questions, the Leopoldina’s proposal and ours converge more than they diverge. Gehring has rightly emphasized this shared structural diagnosis. Both approaches argue that scientific communication infrastructure should be financed through regular public procurement and competitively tendered procedures—the standard procurement procedure for all other forms of public infrastructure. Both emphasize the importance of resilience against political interference and natural disasters. Both seek to bring governance to the scientific community itself. Taken together, these three elements would also be able to curb systematic data extraction.
The EU-supported solution Open Research Europe (ORE) aligns strikingly well with these principles. It was competitively tendered, is now financed in a decentralized fashion, and is slated for further technical decentralization to improve resilience. Governance is to be embedded within scientific institutions. In its financial and infrastructural logic, ORE reflects a growing consensus, visible as well in the EU Council conclusions on the “hazards of scholarly publishing“.
Where differences remain is in the social dimension—above all, in the role of journals as constitutive spaces of scholarly communities. Here Gehring’s skepticism toward overly universal solutions is justified. Journals function differently across disciplines. In mathematics, flagship journals are often run by leading researchers and actively shape the fields’ trajectories. By stark contrast, in the economic heavyweight biomedicine, editorial control of the most important journal rests with professional editors long removed from active research—often derisively labeled “failed scientists”—making this domain particularly susceptible to corporate steering. In much of physics, journals have become mere formal reference points to provide line-items on CVs, while the substantive exchange takes place on the preprint server arXiv. In these fields, researchers would likely only notice a demise of journals once they tried to submit their work there. Other disciplines organize themselves around conferences and their published proceedings. Again others around single, specialized journals. In the humanities, editorial labor and book culture remain central; publishing is not merely dissemination but part of the epistemic process itself.
Such heterogeneity renders a single organizational template implausible. A science-led infrastructure would not erase disciplinary differences; it would enable them to flourish without structural distortion. Distinct scholarly communities can be perceived, in effect, as distinct social formations. Contemporary digital social technologies—tried and tested outside academia—offer possibilities here that remain underexplored. Humanities Commons and their Mastodon instance, hcommons.social, are instructive examples of what would be possible, if scholarship were to embrace social technologies for its social needs.
For this reason, the path opened by ORE deserves broad support from within the scholarly community. Through shared governance, no discipline need be structurally privileged. Institutions large and small would be able to run interoperable nodes, independently or cooperatively. User-facing layers could remain adaptable to disciplinary needs. Infrastructure would become enabling rather than prescriptive.
To modernize infrastructure does not mean abolishing everything that preceded it. Some elements of seventeenth-century journal culture have become obsolete or even counter-productive; others continue to serve valuable functions. A decentralized infrastructure allows communities to preserve what works while reforming what does not.
Despite reviewer fatigue mounting in many fields, Leopoldina’s approach of reviewing proposals for the design of journals, nevertheless deserves attention. Within a modern infrastructure, such processes can be implemented more transparently and adaptively. Perhaps, even, e.g. in highly competitive domains like biomedicine, such carefully redesigned review mechanisms—perhaps focused on curating and verifying reproducibility—could even help mitigate the replication crisis. Infrastructure need not be a passive conduit. Properly designed, it becomes a co-producer of epistemic quality.
An infrastructure for all sciences does not necessitate uniformity. It implies cooperative solutions to shared problems. It implies the opportunity to build conduits between the historically separated silos of the disciplines. Let’s phrase it economically: the gap between the actual cost of publishing an average article and the prices charged by legacy publishers—now increasingly operating as data-analytics and surveillance conglomerates—is estimated at 80–90 percent. Global implementation of either the Leopoldina’s model or our decentralized alternative would conservatively free 8–9 billion dollars or euros annually, even after accounting for ongoing publication costs. A fraction of that sum would dramatically expand the scope for innovation in scholarly communication.
Gehring’s critique of what she calls an “openness misunderstanding” warrants a closer treatment, because much of today’s discussion seems to revolve around it. In the natural sciences, the literature remained largely ‘closed’ behind paywalls until the early 2010s. Journal price inflation had reached such levels that even sustained cuts to humanities acquisitions could not preserve subscriptions in the sciences. Literature searches were more often exercises in contingency rather than systematic inquiry. The gradual erosion of paywalls roughly fifteen years ago transformed this landscape. Only once broad access had been restored via the various legal and illegal holes ion the paywalls, consortia such as Germany’s DEAL could start to credibly terminate contracts and renegotiate from a position of strength. It is hardly coincidental that publishers simultaneously pivoted toward data analytics and surveillance-based services.
In the experimental sciences today, “Open Science” means far more than access to articles. It entails access to protocols, data, software, and code—the entire research workflow. Without such transparent documentation, reproducibility is hard to be assessed. In this context, the paywalled article has ceased to be the principal bottleneck. What matters is structured, machine-readable documentation of methods and data—precisely what decentralized infrastructures can facilitate and partially automate.
Openness, however, is not identical to a commons. To be “open” describes a property of content. A commons describes a governance relation: a resource maintained and regulated by a community. Open Science can be a precondition for a scholarly commons, but it does not guarantee one. Only when scholarly communities design, operate, and govern their own communication infrastructures does openness become collective self-organization. In this light, ORE can be understood as a move toward a commons. Its defining feature is not mere accessibility, but shared responsibility for maintenance, development, and rule-setting.
Distinguishing financial-technical from social dimensions is therefore not merely analytical hygiene; it is a safeguard against the subordination of scholarly norms to market imperatives—precisely what the current publishing system exemplifies. A genuinely public infrastructure offers the best available space for continuous, experimental refinement of scholarly communication within a commons framework.
Gehring’s further suspicion—that the scientific system’s own appetite for metrics and data contributes to the crisis—becomes more and more difficult to dismiss with each passing year since our ‘replacing’ publication. One must now ask whether institutional leadership and political administrators have been complicit in creating and reinforcing structural dependencies that ultimately reinforce corporate parasitism and operate against scholarly and democratic values. The growing institutional inertia, even amid mounting evidence of rights violations and governance failures, suggests that also inside academia, we may have powerful actors for whom scholarship is not their top priority.
From Debate to Decision
For three decades, the crisis of scientific publishing has been diagnosed and dissected. Viable alternatives exist. Practical implementations—from ORE to PCI—demonstrate feasibility. On core financial and infrastructural principles, consensus is closer than commonly assumed.
What is missing is not analysis but resolve. As long as debate substitutes for action, dependency deepens. Each year consolidates corporate dominance and narrows the window of opportunity for self-determination.
The proposals discussed here differ in emphasis, but they converge toward a scholarly commons: an infrastructure that institutionalizes openness and anchors governance within the scientific community; that enables communities to design their own communication spaces instead of just being users. The question is not merely efficiency or cost reduction. It is whether science will retain sovereignty over its own communicative and epistemic conditions.
The diagnosis is clear. The instruments are available. The question is no longer whether change is necessary, but when, if ever, the scholarly community will act on what it has learned in these last decades.
The debate has run its course. Decisions are due.
























